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We turn now to the application of our methods of measuring price
competitiveness to particular nonferrous metals, such as copper and
aluminum.
In considering nonferrous metals, an observer is likely to think that
they fall into the category of highly standardized commodities in
universal demand, for which prices will act swiftly and efficiently to
localize production at the cheapest source. This view may be funda-
mentally correct as a description of the long-run tendencies at work,
but to understand the actual role of prices in the real world it is
necessary to consider some of the geographical and institutional factors
that interfere with, or at least influence, the operation of the price
mechanism in nonferrous metal markets.
Geographical Influences
A conspicuous influence on the direction of trade in nonferrous metals
is the location of ores in relation to markets. Among the major metals
mentioned above, copper, silver, lead, and zinc ores are relatively
common, while deposits of tin and nickel ores are less widespread.
Lead and zinc ores are found, for example, both in the United States
and in Western Europe. In most cases, however, the advanced industrial
countries do not possess sufficient quantities of these ores to meet
their needs. This is true even for the United States, which is one of
the world's greatest• mine producers of each of these metals. The
pressure of demand and the of the cheaper sources have
forced recourse to less desirable ores and thus have' tended to make
the domestic metals expensive compared with those available from
Canada, Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere. In many instances, the
absolute volume of output in these places is smaller than in the United
States, but much or all of it is exported because domestic demand is
small or nonexistent. Thus the net exports of a country depend notCompetitiveness in Individual Groups 17
merely upon access to ore supplies but also upon access to ore supplies
in quantities that are abundant relative to its home needs. The pos-
session of domestic ore supplies may not be an advantage in the non-
ferrous metals trade, however, if they can be exploited only at a
relatively high cost. A high-cost domestic mining industry frequently
demands protective policies that result in high domestic prices and
are, therefore, a competitive disadvantage for domestic metal refining
and fabricating industries. Many of the price differences between the
U.S. and Europe are attributable, in part at least, to the relative
freedom of Europe to acquire ore supplies from the cheapest sources.
Some countries without domestic ore supplies, notably. Great Britain
and Belgium, have been important metal-refining and metal-exporting
countries because they have had access to foreign sources of ores and
because their metal-refining industries have been close to great markets.
The history of the exploration and settlement of the Americas, Africa,
and Oceania, the search for ores, and the financing of mining opera-
tions has left its mark on today's trade flows. Thus, the United States
obtains copper from Chile and lead from Mexico; Britain gets tin from
Malaya and lead from Australia; Belgium imports copper from the
Congo; and France relies upon New Caledonia for nickel ore. New
forces of nationalism and development are weakening many of these
trading and financial ties. Many underdeveloped countries are en-
couraging the processing of their ores at home and even the fabrication
of refined metal into semifinished or finished products. The smelting
of tin,, for example, has been declining in the United Kingdom and
Benelux and rising in Malaya and other ore-producing areas.
Another important factor determining the location of some non-
ferrous metal industries—particularly those dependent upon electrolytic
refining—is the availability of cheap power. This appears to be the
chief explanation for the development in Canada of an aluminum
industry second in the free world only to that of the United States,
even though Canada must rely on bauxite supplies from the Caribbean
area. Cheap power is also the basis for the Norwegian aluminum
industry, whose capacity is exceeded in Western Europe only by the
French industry. To a lesser degree, abundant power is helpful in
nickel refining also. In this metal, however, Canada's position as the
world's leading producer depends mainly on the possession of rich
and extensive ore deposits. The location of a nickel refinery in18 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
Norway, even though it has to use Canadian raw material, may be
attributable to the attraction of low-cost power.
Institutional Influences
In assessing the role that price may play in international competition
in nonferrous metals, it is necessary to take account not only of the
way in which geographical factors affect trade patterns but also of the
manner in which the structure of the metal-refining industries and
the organization of metal markets make it possible for differences in
price levels to exist. In these respects there are, as might be expected,
important differences from one nonferrous metal to another, but there
are also some striking similarities. We shall deal with the similarities
first:
1. In the first place, there are two main markets—New York and
London—for most of the major nonferrous metals in their unwrought
form. The importance of the New York market for some metals,
such as copper, lead, and zinc, arises in part from the large volume of
United States output. However, the more basic factor, one which
applies to all of the nonferrous metals, is the role of the United States
as a consumer. In 1963, for example, the U.S. accounted for about
one-third of total free world consumption of copper, lead, zinc, and
tin and for around half of the consumption of nickel and aluminum
(see Table 6). The London market is important because it is the great
world trading center where the forces of supply and demand can meet
without the restrictions on metal trade that have been imposed in the
United States to protect domestic mines. The London Metal Exchange
is the world's most important organized metal market and substantial
quantities of copper, lead, zinc, and tin that are not actually sold
through the market frequently are transferred at prices prevailing on
the market.
2. As is implied in the foregoing, government laws and regulations
tend to separate metal markets along national boundaries, each market
having its own price level. The most common justifications for these
interferences are defense, foreign currency shortages, and economic
development, although the element of protection is. usually large and
clearly visible. Contrary to the common impression that trade barriers
are being eroded, government impediments to free trade in unwrought
nonferrous metals were probably increasing in. the period covered byCompetitiveness in Individual Groups 19
this study.1 Certainly, this is true of the U.S. for a number of important
metals, although not for aluminum; within the period covered by this
study, the United States reimposed a 1.7 cents per pound duty on
copper and placed imports of lead and zinc under quota. The effects
of such restrictions can be seen in copper, for which the U.S. price
tended to be acentor two a pound higher than the London price.
In other countries protecting domestic mining operations, such as
Australia, Japan, and Spain, copper prices have been 3 to 6 cents
above the London price.2 One of the most extreme illustrations was
provided by a report from India that internal prices of tin, lead, and
zinc were about twice as high as those being quoted on the London
Metal Market.3
Tariffs and quotas are not, however, the only ways in which govern-
ments have affected metal markets. One of the most important in-
fluences on nonferrous metal markets was the building up and then
diminishing of its stockpiles by the U.S. government. During a four-
year period beginning in the middle of 1954, for example, the U.S.
government bought up the equivalent of 20 to 25 per cent of the
domestic production of lead and zinc and acquired substantial quan-
tities of foreign lead and zinc in exchange for agricultural surpluses.
The program buoyed up prices—and production also—but when it
ended, prices slumped. At the end of the period covered by this study,
U.S. disposals served to curb the tendency for prices to rise in the face
of supply shortages.
Government intervention may also have other motives. Illustrations
are provided by two United States regulations on silver. A United
States prohibition against dealing in silver originating in mainland
China led to a premium for non-Chinese silver on the London market
which was sometimes greater than half a cent an ounce.4 U.S. law also
prevented the export of silver purchased from the Treasury, with the
result that in 1959—61, when Treasury sales were an important source
1 See the statement of an official of a U.S. metal-refining company quoted in the
Metal Bulletin, July 5, 1963, p. 29. Since 1964, the terminal year of this study, the
U.S., faced with sharply rising metal prices, has eased some of its protective measures
on imports, but has placed controls on certain exports and intervened vigorously
in the domestic pricing of several metals.
2 J. L. Chender, "Copper," in Engineering and Mining Journal, February 1965,
p. 114.
3 Metal Bulletin, July 17, 1962, p. 10.
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NOTES TO TABLE 6
Source: Càmputed from data in Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesells-
chaft, MetalStatistics, 1954-1963, Frankfurt 1964. Some figures, espe-
cially those for centrally planned economies, are necessarily rough
estimates.
aRefinery production for copper and lead; smelting output for nickel,
zinc, and tin.
bEurope includes Finland, Yugoslavia, and all European OECD
countries except Turkey.
CEastern Bloc includes all countries in the Soviet sphere in Europe
and all countries in the. Chinese sphere in Asia.
dAli countries except Eastern Bloc as defined in note c.
of silver for industrial uses, New York silyer prices were slightly lower
than those in London.5 Perhaps government neutrality is impossible
in the market for a monetary metal, but neither of these regulations
appears to have been necessitated by the monetary use of silver.
3. Another common characteristic of nonferrous metals istheir
susceptibility to alternating phases of overcapacity and extreme short-
age. Mining capacity cannot be altered rapidly, and even changes in
the rate of utilization Of existing capacity apparently cannot be made
The impact of cyclical and secular changes on the demand
for a given metal is difficult to foretell, as can be readily ascertained
from past forecasts in the trade journals. In these circumstances, non-
ferrous metal prices are almost inevitably subject to sharp fluctuations;
within the dozen years covered by this study, for example, there have
been year-to-year upswings and downswings in the annual average
price in excess of 25 per cent for copper, 20 per cent for lead, and
15 per cent for zinc.7 As is pointed out below in connection with
copper prices, many of these fluctuations, because of their timing, are
not reflected in the indexes published here.
Many of the differences among the markets for the various non-
5Handyand Harman, The Silver Market in 1959, p. 9; The Silver Market in 1960,
p. 8; and The Silver Market in 1961, p. 7.Dependenceon Treasury silver was
attributable in part to a widespread strike in the nonferrous refinery industry during
the last half of 1959.
6Forexample, the managera large lead and zinc company was quoted as
saying that". ..adecision today to change the rate of mine production in Australia
would probably take six months or longer to be reflected in the physical metal
available in the large consuming markets" (Metal Bulletin, May 3, 1963, p.14).
7Basedon data in Engineering and Mining Journal, February 1965, p. 83.22 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
ferrous metals stem from differences in the number of producers and
other facets of the structure of thOse industries. For none of the non-
ferrous metals can the number of primary producers outside the
centrally planned be counted in terms of hundreds and
often not even in tens, but the degree of concentration varies from
one metal to another and the same degree of concentration does not
always have the same market significance. The number of producers
of worked metals is larger, but the big primary producers are often
also producers of worked metals. Their pricing policies thus affect
worked-metal prices directly and also indirectly since worked metals
such as sheet are often priced in terms of a margin over the prevailing
primary price. Producers of the major unwrought metals have generally
integrated backward into ore production, although to varying degrees.
In aluminum, for example, important. producers of the metal typically
control their own bauxite sources. In tin, on the other hand, there is
more of an independent market in ore concentrates, although ties
between smelting and ore producers are quite common.
The production of nickel is, perhaps, the most concentrated among
the nonferrous metals. One producer—a Canadian firm which has its
own ore supply—accounts for over half of the free world output, and
the world price of nickel follows closely the price set by this firm.8
The policy of the company. has been to seek stable prices, making
price changes at relatively long intervals.9
The organization of the world aluminum industry has been in a
state of flux during the past decade. For few, if any, other metals was
the prospect for rapid growth in consumption so clear, and new
companies entered the industry and existing ones tried to break into
new geographical markets.'° In the United States the number of
primary producers rose from three in 1953 to seven in 1963; in 1963
the largest of these accounted for 34 per cent of U.S. capacity and
the top three for 86 per cent. In Canada, the leading producer had
85 to 90 per cent of the nation's capacity, and in almost all the other
8 Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress (2nd Session), inquiry
into the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles of the. U.S., Hearings, Washington,
1962, Part 8, pp. 2591 and 2647.
9 Statement of the company president quoted in Metal Bulletin, September 4,
1964, p. 11.
10 Aluminum was also pushed into new uses by the aggressive research and
promotion of its producers. .Corn petitiveness in Individual Groups 23
aluminum-producing countries of the free world primary production
was limited to two to four firms, with the largest usually accounting
for somewhere between 50 and 80 per cent of output." Most of these
firms are integrated into the worked metals stage; in the U.S., for ex-
ample, producers consume around two-thirds of the ingot they
There has been a growing internationalization of the aluminum
industry, which has involved the U.S. as a capital importer as well
as a capital exporter; by the end of 1964 aluminum metal was being
produced in the United States by a subsidiary of a Swiss company, and
subsidiariesof French and Canadian companies were r-producing
worked aluminum products. However, a large part of the shares of
the leading Canadian producer is owned in the U.S. Elsewhere, one
or more of a half-dozen large U.S., Canadian, Swiss, or French
producers are to be found with interests in almost every aluminum-
producing country of the non-Communist world.'3 Tn the struggle for
new markets, production has often been established in new countries
to gain or retain access to markets in the face of protective measures.
The structure of the world copper industry has been relatively stable
during the period of our study. In each of the major producing areas
of the free world, the bulk of refinery output is accounted for by a
few firms—five in the United States, three in Africa (two are British
and one is Belgian), and two in Canada. Two of the United States
firms are also responsible for a large fraction of copper output in
Chile, by far the most important of the Latin American copper-
producing countries, and U.S. firms also have interests in African
production. In addition, some smaller producers market their copper
through one of the large firms. Thus, there are perhaps ten sellers
who market some 80 to 90 per cent of the free world production of
primary copper.14
Among the other major nonferrous metals, the production of tin is
most highly concentrated; two smelting companies in Malaya and
Singapore supply a major share of the metal consumed by the free
11 Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1963 and 1953, Washington, 1964and1956.
12 U.S.DepartmentofCommerce, Aluminum Factbook,Washington,1963,
pp. 16—17.
13 Minerals Yearbook, 1963.
The statements in this paragraph are based in part upon information in the
Minerals Yearbook, 1963, and in part upon information obtained from trade sources.24 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous
world.15 The smelting and refining of silver, lead, and zinc is much
less concentrated partly because these metals are mined and refined in
a larger number of countries. Within individual countries, however,
there are usually a small number of producers; in the United States,
for example, at the end of J.964 there were only five firms which
smelted or refined primary lead.16
There are, however, several factors that limit the market power
that small numbers may confer upon the producers. In aluminum,
very rapid growth in consumption has stimulated competitive ex-
pansion in which the leading firms have struggled to keep their market
position. More generally, an important restraint is imposed by the
existence of intermetal competition (including steel) and by the
availability of nonmetallic materials, especially plastics, as substitutes.
The expansion of aluminum, in particular, has sometimes occurred in
uses formerly served by copper, notably in the electrical and auto-
motive industries. While overlapping financial interests in different
metals exist—particularly in lead and zinc but also in copper and
other metals—by and large the interests which have large stakes in
aluminum differ from.those involved in copper, and the same tends to
be true of other pairs of major nonferrous metals.
Another limitation which varies in importance from one metal to
another and, for a given metal, from one country to another is the
availability of metal recovered from scrap.17 This source of metal
appears to be most important relative to primary production in the
case of lead; in the U.S., for example, it accounts for about one-half
of total production.18 The production of secondary metal tends to be
less concentrated than that of primary metals; again taking lead in the
U.S. as an example, there are over a score of major secondary smelting
15 Minerals Yearbook, 1963. See also Inquiry intothe Strategic and Critical
Material Stockpiles of the U.S., Part 5, p. 1740. The extraction of ore in Malaya is
much more dispersed.
16 U.s. Tariff Commission, Lead and Zinc: Report to the President, Washington,
1965.
17 The impact of scrap is affected also by its spectrum of uses, which varies from
one metal to another; in some cases, such as aluminum, scrap can be used for
fabricating a wide range of products and thus competes directly with the primary
metal, while in others, such as copper, it may compete with the primary metal in
a more limited range of uses.
18 Based on data in Minerals Yearbook, 1963. About 40 per cent of primary
production has been from foreign ore supplies.Competitiveness in Individual Groups 25
firms excluding the six primary producers, some of whom also produce
secondary metal.
A different aspect of the organization of the metal industries that
must be considered in analyzing price competitiveness is the practice
of treating metals on a toll or conversion basis. Much of the copper,
•lead, and zinc exported by Belgium and Germany represents metal
smelted or refined in those countries for a fee paid by the foreign
owner, usually the sales organization of a mining company. It is true
that comparative costs of conversion in different countries may in-
fluence the owner's choice of country of conversion, but the determin-
ing factor may be the availability of capacity and of the technical skill
and facilities required to obtain maximum recovery of the metal
content, including subsidiary elements such as silver, cadmium, and
others. To measure the price competitiveness of the processing country,
we would have to know the toll charges; the prices of the smelted
or refined metal may reflect the price competitiveness of the country
of the owner of the metal to a greater degree than that of the
processing country.
Another factor of significance from time to time for some metals,
particularly aluminum, zinc,tin, and silver, was sales in western
markets by the Soviet Union, other Eastern European countries, and
China. As may be seen from the figures in Table 6, production of
nonferrous metals has been expanding more rapidly in the centrally
planned countries than in the free world; these countries probably
account for close to one-fourth of the world output. The U.S.S.R. is
by far the most important producer in the bloc, accounting for the
bulk, of output and particularly for sales of aluminum in western
markets; China has been a sporadic source of exports of tin and silver
to the west.
Copper
The United States is the world's leading producer of mine copper
(23 per cent of world production), followed by the U.S.S.R., Zambia
(Northern Rhodesia), and Chile (12 to 15 per cent each), Canada (9
per cent), and the Congo Republic (6 per cent).'9 Very little ore
moves in world trade; it is generally more economical to ship copper
after it has been extracted from the ore by concentration, roasting,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)28 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
NOTES TO'TABLE 7
Source: Trade by Commodities, OECD 'Statistical Bulletins, Series
C, 1963, Vols. I and II; 1963 World Trade Annual, United Nations, New
York, 196,4.
alncludes eighteen European countries, U.S., Canada, and Japan.
bFor worked copper, U.S. figures include $4.6 million worth of
copper foil, c.i.f. value estimated from OECD countries' import sta-
tistics, because U.S. copper foil is classified elsewhere in its export
statistics. The total includes these estimated U.S. figures. U.S. ex-
ports figures are from unpublished tabulations of the U.S. Department
of Commerce and are a corrected version of the figures published by
the OECD and the U.N.
CLess than $500,000.
or, most commonly, by smelting. Latin American copper exports
have been divided into roughly equal proportions between Europe
and the U.S. A good part of the Latin American copper reaching
the U.S. is refined and re-exported to Europe, and this copper accounts
for the bulk of U.S. exports. Canada has shipped more copper to
Europe than to the United States. African copper has gone mainly
to Europe with the United Kingdom receiving over 40 per cent of
Zambia's output and Belgium about two-thirds of the Congo's pro-
duction. African and Latin American exports of unwrought copper
were more than One and a half times greater than the exports of the
advanced countries shown in Table 7.20
Whilethe United States used to be an important exporter of copper,
it has generally been a net importer in recent years.21 Most of its
imports have consisted of blister copper (the unwrought product
obtained by smelting the ore), mainly from Chile and to a lesser extent
from Peru and Mexico. At the same time the U.S. has been importing
refined copper; most of these imports, mainly from Canada, have
apparently been absorbed domestically. Exports of refined copper in
the form of cathodes, ingots, and wire-bars to Western Europe, India,
and Japan, and other destinations have not been large enough to
offset all the imports of copper.
OECD countries' exports of worked copper, such as sheet and tube,
20SeeMetal Bulletin, September 24, pp. u—ui.
21Thenet export position shown in Table 7, attributable in part to the refining
and re-export of Latin American copper, covers exports to all countries but imports
only from the OECD countries.Competitiveness in Individual Groups 29
have been about half the dollar volume of their exports of unwrought
copper, although trade in worked copper is less important relative to
unwrought copper for the world as a whole. Germany and Belgium
are the leading exporters of worked copper and European destinations
account for most of the shipments.
While the large producers of primary copper have generally preferred
to sell directly to fabricators, some copper, chiefly secondary metal,
is traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME). The prices estab-
lished on the LME are free market prices. The 1961 turnover on the
LME amounted to only 16.6 per cent of estimated world consumption,
and, as a result of speculation and hedging, only a fraction of the
copper traded was for actual consumption.22 The price of copper on
the LME, however, has a significance (which varies at different times)
beyond that indicated by the amount of metal traded. At times, the
large producers sold copper to markets outside the U.S. under long-
term contracts setting minimum and maximum quantities, with the
price for each lot to be determined by the quotation on the LME at
the time of shipment or delivery. However, the LME tends to be very
sensitive to changes in and demand conditions and to produce
sharp fluctuations in price. In 1956, for example, the price of copper
was driven up to £437 per ton only to fall back by the end of the
year to £240. Such fluctuations led the European producers to abandon
the system of pricing based on freely determined LME prices. They
controlled the LME price through open-market operations while
simultaneously curtailing production and accumulating stocks. From
the latter part of 1961 to the beginning of 1964, the producers succeeded
in stabilizing the LME price of copper at £234 per ton (29.25 cents
per pound).23 In the U.S. the price remained at 30.6 cents per pound
(31.0 cents delivered) during this period. It was reported that the
producers had disposed of the surplus stocks they had acquired in their
22Accordingto one source, deliveries amounted to about 20 per cent of the trading
volume (Economist, February 22, 1964, p. 733). The estimate of trading turnover
as a share of world consumption was reported to the Metal Bulletin, March 20,
1962, p. 8.
28Altogetherabout 160,000 tons of copper (worth over $100 million) were pur.
chased in this operation (Metal Bulletin, June 19, 1964, p. 12). According to one
estimate, the 1962 price might have been about £220 per ton(27.5 cents per lb.)
without producer support(J. Zimmerman, "Copper," Engineering and Mining
Journal, February 1963, p. 101). For a brief assessment of the copper price operations
of the producers, see the Economist, October 9, 1965, pp. 185—187.30 Comparative Prices of IVon ferrous Metals
price support operations through cut-rate sales to Eastern Europe,
Japan, and A new, and apparently unanticipated, surge of de-
mand in 1964, coupled with strikes in the U.S. and Chile, caught the pro-
ducers without the stocks necessary to prevent price increases. The
Chilean government also was pressing for price increases.25 In January
1964, the producers abandoned their efforts to control the LME price
and toward the end of. the year they were prorationing supplies to
their customers at £260 per ton while the LME price was £520.
The producers made these determined efforts to keep prices from
rising for fear that high copper prices would, beyond a certain point,
encourage the long-run substitution of aluminum and plastics for
copper and thus adversely affect the value of their ore deposits. Price
instability was also thought to encourage such substitution particularly
because aluminum prices were very stable until the last few years of
the period.26 Finally, the producers feared that the high temporary
profits created by high prices would have a ratchet effect on wages, leav-
ing copper less able in the long run to compete with other materials.
The fact that these motives are common to all the major producers
does not mean that they always acted together. The U.S. producers
were enjoined by law from collaborating to fix prices,27 and the
European producers did not always agree on the proper course.
In 1955—56, for example, one British firm, in an effort to keep prices
from rising, sold its copper at prices lower than the LME prices
which were used by the other major producers. On the other hand,
the U.S. and the European-based primary producers apparently have
24 See Metal Bulletin, June 19, 1964,p.12, and Engineeringand Mining Journal,
February 1964, p. 115.
25 New York Times, October 6, 1964.
26 It was reported, for example, that aluminum was substituted for copper in
making lamp bulb bases when the price of copper soared to 46 cents a pound in
19.56 and that bulb makers feared to switch back to copper even after the price
fell to 25 cents (New York Times, March 15, 1964).
27 See New York Times, December 29, 1963, for a report that describes one U.S. -
coppermining official as resenting the notion of U.S. collaboration in price mainte-
nance; the official referred to the attitude of U.S. producers as one of "benevolent
neutrality" toward the price stabilization efforts of foreign producers. The U.S.
producers could hardly avoid taking account of the pricing policies of the foreign
producers and the impact that their own production policies would have on the
world-wide copper situation. Thus, as was pointed out by a copper merchant, the
U.S. producers cut their production by 5 to 10 per cent in July 1962 when foreign
firms were supporting the LME prices even though U.S. consumption exceeded U.S.
production. See J. Zimmerman, "Copper," in Engineering and Mining Journal,
February 1963, p. 102.Competitiveness in Individual Groups 31
not competed in each others' home markets. For example, one large
U.S. buyer of unwrought copper stated in the course of an interview
that his company could never obtain foreign copper at a price lower
than the domestic price. In general, the U.S. producers appear to have
been more able to curtail and expand production to meet the swings
in demand, with the result that the producers' price in the United
State has tended to be more stable than that in Europe. The U.S.
producers' price has also tended to be slightly higher, the main ex-
ceptions being in the years 1953—55. The reimposition of the 1.7 cents
per pound duty by the U.S. in July 1958 made it more likely that
a differential between the European and U.S. producers' prices would
be maintained.28
Merchants were critical of the pricing policies followed by the
producers in 1961—64. They argued that the producer-controlled prices
did not permit the, price mechanism to provide guidance to consumers
and producers. The producers, on the other hand, felt that the
merchants were more interested in the active trading that would come
with frequent price changes than in the long-run trend of copper
consumption.
In any case, producer pricing led to a multiple price system for
copper. In periods of slack, consumers in the United States and Europe
were able to obtain merchant copper at prices lower than those
maintained by producers, and in periods of tightness they had to pay
higher prices for a part of their supplies. According to one estimate,
for example, about 25 per cent of free world copper was purchased
at premium prices in 1964; in the' U.S. about 20 per cent was exchanged
at premium prices.29 In markets outside the United States and Europe,
the producers themselves were reported sometimes to have departed
from their regular prices, particularly, as we have already noted, in the
case of occasional sales to Eastern Europe, Russia, and Japan.
The price relationships produced by these structural and market
features of the world copper industry are shown in Table 8. The
time-to-time indexes indicate that the levels of world copper prices
28 The statements about prices inthis paragraph are based largely on the
Engineering and Mining Journal average prices for copper sales in the U.S. and
outside the U.S. The prices are taken from reports of producers accounting for
80 to 85 per cent of the copper trade (E & MJ Metal and Mineral Markets, June
24, 1963).
29 J• L. Chender, "Copper," in Engineering and Mining Journal, February 1965,
p. 113.32 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
TABLE.8
indexesof International Prices and Price Competitiveness,
Copper, SITC Group 682, 1953-64
Country 1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
A. International Price Indexes







95 100 100 100 107
9.4 99 100 100 112







B. International Price Levels
(U.S. for each year =100)
100 100 100 100 100
93 93 95 94 99
96 95 94 94 104










99 99 100 100 105
102 101 100 100 111
Source: As indicated in the text, we had extensive data on pro-
ducers' export prices of unwrought copper for the last few years of our
study. For the earlier years, we had to rely on prices supplied by two
very large purchasers in U.S. and European markets and by several
smaller U.S. and foreign purchasers; these sources were also available
for the later years. For worked copper, the sources were almost en-
tirely buyers; the main exception was Germany, for which we had a
number of index series of export prices. Counting the latter as a single
source, we had a dozen sources of information on worked copper
prices; only a minority was from the U.S.
Method: As noted in the text, different price relationships seem to
prevail for brass and copper. Trade statistics do not differentiate be-
tween' copper and its alloys and we had to assume that about one-
fourth of trade consisted of alloys on the basis of the facts that brass
mills absorb one-third of copper refined in the U.S. and that copper
alloys take about one-fifth of U.K. copper. (Metal Statistics,
pp.161 and 135.) The method of handling premium-price copper sales
is given in the text; a similar technique was used for other years in
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NOTES 'TO TABLE 8 (concluded)
which copper appeared to be available at prices other than those
quoted by producers although the discounts and premiums were much
smaller than the 1964 premiums.
The indexes were computed separately for SITC groups 682.1 and
682.2 and then combined with the 1963 trade weights. For worked cop-
per at least, the more important five-digit categories were weighted
separately. These were bars, rods, shapes, and wire. (682.21), plate,
'sheet, andstrip(682.22), and tubes and pipes (682.25); these cate-
gories accounted for23, and 26 per cent, respectively of SITC
subgroup 682.2. In the case of unwrought copper (subgroup 682.1), 96
per cent consisted of refined copper (682.12) and no attempt was made
to weight at the five-digit level.
Ineach case foreign to U.S. place-to-place indexes for 1961 or 1962
were used as the starting point for the calculation of the place-to-place
figures for the other years. Indexes of price competitiveness, derived
from the time-to-time indexes, were used to derive the place-to-place
relatives for other years from the 1961 or 1962 relatives. The years
1961 or 1962 were taken as the starting point because data were abun-
dant and/or subject to smaller dispersion than the 1963 and 1964 data.
In a few instances, wholesale price series were used to fill gaps in
the time-to-time data.
In calculating the EEC indexes, the time-to-time series for the differ-
ent member countries were combined at the five-digit level by weighting
the series for each member country for which data were available ac-
cording to the country's relative importance in EEC exports in the
category involved. In the EEC-U.S. place-to-place comparisons, the
lowest EEC price was taken for each available price comparison with
the U.S.
aSITc group 682.
bThese indexes show how the prices of each foreign area changed
relative to U.S. prices. For example, the figure 105 for the U.K. in
1964 indicates that U.K. export prices of copper were 5 per cent higher
relative to U.S. export prices of copper than they were in 1962 (the
base year).
were not very different at the various dates of reference used in our
study, except for the last one (see panel A). While this istrue, it
gives a misleading impression of the stability of copper prices over
the twelve-year period; prices soared to high levels between 1953 and
1957 and sank to low levels between 1957 and 1961. Using the midyear
prices of U.S. producers to indicate the magnitude of the changes,
we find that the price of primary copper was between 28.5 and 32
cents a pound at every one of our reference dates, but it, was over
45 cents in 1956 and less than 25 cents in 1958.34 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
For our reference years, movements in U.S. and U.K. prices
corresponded closely, and until the very last year U.K. prices were
6 or 7 per cent lower than those of the United States (see panel B).
The same relationship with U.S. prices characterized the Common
Market, in which the Belgian prices were the most important, for
1962 and 1963, but EEC prices were a little closer to U.S. levels at the
beginning of the period and higher than U.S. prices in the final year.
Germany, with less direct access to primary copper, was sometimes in
a less favored position relative to the United States than were the
United Kingdom and Belgium.
The European export prices of worked copper products, such as
sheet and pipe, tended to be lower relative to the United States
prices than was the case for unwrought copper; this was particularly
true of brass products. U.K. export prices were only a few percentage
points below, those of the U.S. for unwrought copper, but around 12
per cent lower for worked copper in 1962, for example. However, Un-
wrought copper was about twice as important as worked copper in the
exports of the advanced countries, and this fact was reflected in the
weights used in preparing the indexes.
Until the final year of our period, the price position of the United
Kingdom and the Common Market as a whole relative to that of the
• United States hardly changed (see panel C). There is some evidence,
on the other hand, that the German position relative to the United
States improved; this appears to reflect the movement
of high initial German prices closer to the prices prevailing in
Belgium, the other important Common Market exporter (see Table 7).
The indexes for 1964 are subject to additional margins of error
because, while in general we had rather comprehensive information,
there was a key piece missing. For 1964 as for other recent years,
we have extensive data covering sellers' prices of unwrought copper
abroad, as well as a good sample of prices of worked copper products.
We also have good information, about the premium prices that were
paid for unwrought copper; these varied widely during the year and
from market to market but the mean premium seems to have been
in the range of 25 to 40 per cent above the producers' price. What
we do not know is the fraction of each country's exports of unwrought
copper that was sold at premium prices. On the basis of informationCompetitiveness in Individual Groups 35
gleaned from trade journalsand from conversations with people in
the trade, we have taken the premium-price exports to be 10 per cent
for the United States, 25 per cent for the United Kingdom, 100 per
cent for Germany, and 50 per cent for the Common Market as a
whole. The possible margins of error introduced by this assumption
may be indicated by the fact that the alternative assumption—that
premium-price exports constituted 10 per cent of the unwrought copper
exports of each country—results in 1964 price levels lower by two points
for the United Kingdom and four points for the EEC than the figures
shown in Table 8 (panel B). Corresponding adjustments in the indexes
of competitiveness would affect the magnitude but not the fact of a
relative improvement in the competitive position of the United States
between 1963 and 1964.81
Aluminum
The United States, the U.S.S.R., and Canada accounted for about 68
per cent (38, 18, and 12 per cent, respectively) of primary aluminum
production in 1962—63. World production has been expanding rapidly
and has become more dispersed; in 1953—54, for example, world output
was only about half of the 1962—63 level and the three leading
countries accounted for about 78 per cent of production (47, 12 and
19 per cent, respectively). Production has been rising most rapidly
in Japan, India, and the Soviet sphere. The number of producers
has tended to expand within each country, although it still remains
small.32
About 20 per cent of unwrought aluminum production enters world
80 See, for example, Metal Bulletin, October 6,1964, p.15, and Chender, in
Engineering and Mining Journal, February 1965, p. 113.
81 Actually, the figures in the table probably understate slightly the improve-
ment in the U.S. position since the 10 per cent estimate is more likely to be too
high than too low.
32 The data in this and the following paragraphs are based mainly on Minerals
Yearbook, 1963, and earlier editions, and Metal Statistics, 51st and earlier annual
issues (Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, Germany). These
sources also show the patterns of production and trade in bauxite. The U.S. imports
over 80 per cent of its bauxite requirements; the U.S.S.R. less than one-fourth.
France alone of the major aluminum producers is a net exporter of bauxite; most
others, like Canada and Norway, import virtually all they use. Almost half of the
world's supply of bauxite is produced in the Caribbean area, particularly in Jamaica,
Surinam, and British Guiana. In Europe, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece follow
the U.S.S.R. and France in production. (Production data for the centrally planned
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NOTES TO TABLE 9
Source:Trade by Commodities, OECD Statistical Bulletins, Series
C, 1963, Vol. I; 1963 World Trade Annual, United Nations.
alncludes eighteen European countries, U.S., Canada, and Japan.
bU.S. export figures are from unpublished tabulations of the U.S.
Department of Commerce and are a corrected version of the figures
published by the OECD and the U.N.
°Less than $500,000.
trade. The pattern of trade differs substantially from the pattern of
production. The U.S., with its high absorptive capacity for metals,
has played a smaller role in world, trade than might be inferred
from its importance in world production. In recent years, U.S. exports
of primary aluminum have been less than 15 per cent of the free
world total, with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Latin America
the main destinations. U.S. exports have been equivalent to 7 or 8
per cent of domestic production; imports—well over half from Canada,
and the rest almost entirely from Norway and France—to 17 or 18
per cent (see Table 9).
Canada, which consumes about 15 per cent of its own production
of unwrought aluminum, supplies about half of the world's exports.
Norway and France are also important exporters; the former, like
Canada, sells most of its output abroad.38 A limited number of destina-
tions tend to account for a large share of each country's exports. Over
half of French exports are to the Common Market and over a quarter
to the U.S.; about two-thirds of Canadian exports are sent to the
U.S. and the U.K.; and about three-quarters of Norwegian exports
are shipped to the U.K., the U.S., and Germany. U.S. exports, however,
have a more varied list of destinations.
The. smaller trade in worked aluminum is more dispersed. Canada
and Norway are smaller factors; and Germany, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (with about equal export volumes)
furnish about two-thirds of the exports of the advanced countries.
Germany and Belgium send their exports largely to European destina-
tions; the U.K. and the U.S. to more varied markets.
Aluminum was not traded on any metal exchange during the period
88TheU.S.S.R. is also a significant exporter, with the bulk of its shipments going
to other communist countries.Competitiveness in Individual Groups 39
of this study and hence was producer priced. The price leadership
of the major Canadian producer appears to have been widely accepted
at least for nominal purposes in world trade. The Canadian firm has
generally avoided any challenge to other price leaders in their domestic
markets (as in the U.S.); 84theexistence of tariffs and transport costs
has permitted small differences between prices in different countries.
While changes in the posted world prices of aluminum ingot—the
key item in the price structure—have not been sales below
the nominal world price have been common, especially in the last few
years when the struggle for the growing world market among the major
producers seemsto have intensified.Sales of Russian aluminum
added to the competitive pressures. Price cutting appears to have been
common in sales made by major producers of one country in the
markets of other major producing countries. Large buyers in these
markets, willing to follow aggressive purchasing policies and not
setting a high premium on the continuity of their sources of supply,
could usually find aluminum at 1 or 2 cents below the list price.56
As a result there was cross shipping of identical products between
the U.S. and Europe; indeed, more than one reliable source reported
occasional purchases of U.S. aluminum in Europe for reshipment to
the U.S. The market for European aluminum in the United States
appears to have been confined largely to the coastal areas, particularly
the Eastern seaboard and the Great Lakes region. The aluminum
industry is more highly integrated vertically than the copper industry,
and competition sometimes focused on worked aluminum products as
well as on ingot.37
34Onprice leadership, see the Metal Bulletin, April 1, 1958, p. 13; February 16,
1962, P., 13; and December 13, 1963, p. 13. See also Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.,
Aluminum Industry, September 1965, P. 10.
35Thoughthe ingot price changed three times in 1964, there were only twenty
changes in the previous eighteen years. Irving Lipkowitz, in Engineering and Mining
Journal, February 1965, p. 98.
36Publicstatements about these practices are naturally infrequent, but the head
of the largest French aluminum firm was quoted in the press near the end of 1962
as acknowledging that French aluminum wasbeingoffered 'in the U.S. at 22.5 cents
a pound at a time when the U.S. list price was 24 cents. (The U.S. duty of 1.25
cents and freight were apparently paid by the seller.) He was also cited as saying
that foreign aluminum—U.S., Canadian, or japanese—was being offered in France
at less than the French domestic price of 22.5 cents despite a duty of 15 per cent
(New York Times, November 16, 1962).
37MetalBulletin, January 1, 1963, p. 18.40 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
TABLE 10
Indexes of International Prices and Price
Competitiveness, Aluminum, 1953-64
SITC
Country Group 1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
A.International Price Indexes
(1962 for each country =100)
U.S. 684 100 108 103 100 97 103
684.la 104 109 103 100 94 103
92 107 102 100 101 103
U.K. 684 98 112 105 100 100 107
EEC 684 107 109 103 100 97 104
fl.international PriceLevels
(U.S.for each year =100)
U.S. 684 100 100 100 100 100 100
U.K. 684 91 94 94 92 95 95
EEC 684 96. 90 90 89 91 90
C.Indexes of U.S. Price Competitivenessc
(1962 =100)
Relative
to U.K. 684 99 103 102 100 104 104
Relative
to EEC 684 108 101 101 100 100 101
Source: Information on aluminum prices comes from about a score
of sources in addition to the various German exporters whose data con-
tributed to the German price series. A little over half of the sources are.
American and a large majority are purchasers. As noted in the text, our
data include prices for a large fraction of U.S. exports and the place-
to-place comparisons are, in some instances, based on as many as sev-
eral hundred observations.
Method: Separate indexes were computed for 'SITC groups 684.1
(unwrought aluminum) and 684.2 (worked aluminum), and the figures in
the table represent the combination of these two sets of indexes with
the aid of 1963 trade weights.
(continued)Competitiveness in Individual Groups 41
NOTES TO TABLE 10 (concluded)
The points.made in the notes to Table 9 (copper) about the deriva-
tion of the place-to-place indexes and about the calculation of the EEC
indexes apply here also.
aTjnwrought aluminum.
bWork'ed aluminum.
CThese indexes show how the prices of each foreign area changed
relative to U.S. prices. For example, the figure 104 for the.U.K. in 1964
indicates that U.K. export prices of aluminum were .4 per cent higher
relative to U.S. export prices of aluminum than they were in 1962 (the
base year).
The dispersion of prices makes the average relationships shown in
Table 10 less representative than others shown in similar tables.
Furthermore, the figures for the United Kingdom and the
underlying figures for some of the Common Market countries are not
based on a broad enough sample of prices to produce reliable averages
in this situation.38 The figures for the U.S. and Germany, on the other
hand, are believed to be reliable; the former are based on producers'
data that represent a high fraction of U.S. exports, as well as on
buyers' information of more limited scope, and the latter on both
purchasers' data .andon more than a score of export price series.
The time-to-time indexes of the U.S., the U.K., and the EEC
(panel A) show similar directions of change for the most part, although
there are sufficient differences to cause variations in relative price
levels. In general, the European prices have been 5 to 10 per cent
lower than those of the U.S. (see panel B). Within Europe, EEC
prices have generally been lower than U.K. prices.
The differences between U.S. and European prices have generally
been significantly smaller for ingot and other forms of unwrought
aluminum; indeed, European export prices have in some instances been
higher than those of the United States. For worked aluminum, how-
ever, European prices have in many cases been 15 to 20 per cent
lower than those of the U.S. In 1962, a year for which there was
a substantial number of observations, the international price levels
were as follows (U.S. =100):
38However,the place-to-place comparisons for the Common Market and the U.S.
in 1961 and 1962 are reliable, each being based on several hundred observations.42 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
EEC
U.K. Total Germany
Aluminum (684) 92 89 94
Unwrought aluminum (684.1) 95 95 101
aluminum (684.2) 86 80 82
Within the EEC, French prices have tended to be relatively low for
unwrought aluminum while German and Belgian. prices have been
relatively low for worked aluminum. As in the case of copper, where
a similar situation prevailed between U.S. and European prices, trade
in the more highly fabricated stage is only half as important as trade
in the less processed material, and the indexes are weighted accordingly.
The over-all changes in price competitiveness (panel C) have been
relatively small and, with the exception of the improvement of the
and German positions after the earlier years, there does not
seem to have been any trend.
Other Nonferrous Metals
For the one-third of world nonferrous trade that does not consist of
aluminum and copper, we do not present separate indexes. However,
the more important of these metals are commented upon in the
following paragraphs.
NICKEL
Canada accounted for 58 per cent of the world's mine production of
nickel in 1962—63; about 80 per cent of Canadian output came from
one company. The other major producing countries are the U.S.S.R.
(23 per cent), and New Caledonia (8 per cent).39 The sole U.S.
producer accounted for only about 3 per cent of the world's supply
of mine nickel. The United States, which uses over a third of all the
nickel consumed in the world, imports about 90 per cent of its
requirements.
As might be expected from this situation, Canada is by far the
89Thesefigures are based on data in G. C. Ware, "Nickel," Minerals Yearbook,
1963. Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft data (Statistical Tables on Metals) give
a little higher share for Canada and a somewhat lowçr share for the U.S.S.R. The
latter source also indicates that both the Canadian and U.S.S.R. shares have fallen
in the period since 1953—54, while the successive editions of the Minerals Yearbook
indicate a sharper drop for Canada (from 67 per cent) and a slight rise for the
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most important factor in world trade in nickel; it accounts for about
two-thirds of free world exports of unwrought nickel and its alloys.
Most of the rest of the export trade is carried on by Norway and the
United Kingdom which rely almost entirely on Canadian ore. Canada
exports little ore to the U.S., but around 75 to 85 per cent of her
exports of unwrought metal have gone to the U.S. The United States
also gets some unwrought nickel—about 20 per cent of its imports—from
Norway, France, and the U.K. In European and other markets outside
North America, the U.K. and Norway often match and sometimes
exceed Canadian sales. France, using New Caledonian ore, is a smaller
exporter.
The countries with the most advanced metallurgical industries
—the U.S., the U.K., and Germany—accounted for about 75 per cent
of 1963 trade in worked nickel and nickel alloys in such forms as
bars, sections, wire, plates, sheets, and tubes... The main destinations
were other industrial countries. Canada and France, mentioned above
as exporters of unwrought nickel, were net importers of worked nickel.
As already noted, the Canadian firm that isthe world's largest
producer acts as a price leader and has followed a policy of stable
prices. During the early part of the period covered by this study, nickel
was in short supply owing in large measure to the impact of the
Korean War upon U.S. government demands for current use (jet
engines, among others) and stockpiling. During these years of shortage
(1953—57), the posted price of nickel rose only by 20—25 per cent, but
smaller producers sometimes got higher prices, and free market sales
at extremely high prices were reported.4° By 1957 free world output
was 50 per cent higher than in 1953 and U.S. government demands
had eased. The producers' price remained constant for a period of
four and a half years beginning in December 1956. At the end of
June 1961, there was a 10 per cent price increase, but the demand con-
ditions were such that small producers were reported to be shading the
official price.4' The price was reduced by about 2.75 per cent in
May 1962, but even at this level production had to be cut in the latter
part of the year. Demand strengthened in 1963 and even more markedly
in 1964, but no further price changes were made.
4° Metal Bulletin, May 29, 1962, p.9. The Engineering and Mining Journal
reported free market prices of $3 a pound when the producers' price was 64.5 cents
(February 1963, p. 142).
4i Metal Bulletin, May 29, 1962, p. 9.44 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
The evidence we have, from a half dozen' sources, mainly foreign,
suggests that European export prices have been slightly lower than
those of the U.S. The differences are more marked for worked nickel
products, but these were only about one-fourth as important, as un-
wrought nickel, for which price differences appeared to be small.
Prices seem to have moved largely along parallel lines in the different
countries.
SILVER AND PLATINUM METALS
At least small amounts of silver are produced in a large number of
countries, but the 'Americas (chiefly Mexico, Peru, the U.S.,and,,
Canada) accounted for about three-quarters of free world output
in 1963.42
In most years the United States consumes more silver than it
produces and it imports significant quantities from Canada, Mexico,
and Peru. Germany and Belgium have also been important in the
world silver markets' (mainly as re-exporters), and China disposed of
large quantities in 1960—62 (probably in large part from the de-
monetization of coins) although the U.S. was not, of course, a buyer
of silver from this source. Until recently, consumption of silver for
.coinage and for industrial uses had been expanding at about equal
rates, with coinage absorbing between 20 and 35 per cent of' world
silver consumption. The enormous increase in U.S. coin requirements
in the last few years has greatly altered the world silver market; the
increase in silver absorbed for U.S. coinage in 1964 compared with
1962 was equivalent to more than one-third of all world silver con-
sumption in 1962. In addition, world consumption of silver for in-
dustrial uses alone has, for some years, exceeded world
Despite the homogeneity of silver and its worldwide use, silver
prices in different places are, not always equal, even allowing 'for
transfer costs. Some U.S. regulations causing price differences have
already been mentioned but other illustrations may easily be found.
One of the largest price differences—resulting from strict controls over
42J.P. Ryan, "Silver," in Minera'l's Yearbook, 1963, Table14. According to
estimates given in this source, the main producer in the Soviet Bloc is the U.S.S.R.
with more than 10 per Cent of world output.
43Handyand Harman, The Silver Market in 1964, p. 19. Beginning in 1965,
however, U.S. coinage requirements were sharply curtailed by a shift to the use
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imports and exports—has been between the Indian price and others.
The lowest Indian price during 1964, for example, was $1.58 an
ounce compared to a U.S. high of $1.293 and an English high of
Silver prices in New York and London rose from around 83 cents
an ounce in 1953 to 85 cents in 1954—55 and then to the 89—91 cents
range in 1956—61. The suspension by the U.S. Treasury of sales of
nonmonetized silver at the end of 1961, an action related to growing
coinage requirements, led to a sharp increase in prices to $1.293(in
September 1963), a ceiling established by the availability of Treasury
silver at this price through the redemption of silver certiE.•cates.
London and New York silver prices have moved in close accord,
with the London price usually slightly higher. Prices have moved
somewhat more independently on the Continent, apparently at a
higher level than U.S. or U.K. prices. The only deviation from
published prices that was reported to us referred to silver originating
in the Soviet Bloc.
Of the platinum metals grouped with silver in the SITC, platinum.
and palladium are the most important; iridium, osmium, rhodium,
and ruthenium are also included. These metals have properties of
chemical inertness, hardness, and ability to withstand heat that make
them useful as catalysts in chemical processes, as refractory materials,
and as durable electrical contacts in communications switchgear.45
The U.S.S.R., Canada, and South Africa are the major sources of
supply. The United States, which accounts for half to two-thirds of
free world consumption, has obtained its platinum metals chiefly
from Canada and the United Kingdom, with lesser supplies coming
from the U.S.S.R. and Switzerland.46 The U.K. is by far the most
important exporter of these metals, supplying not only the U.S. but
also the Common Market, Japan, and even Canada.
Platinum metals have been exported from the U.K. at prices slightly
below those of the U.S., and Continental prices have been only a
shade above those of the U.K. There was, however, a relatively sharp
rise in the German price of platinum between 1963 and 1964, and,
44Ibid.,pp.12,16, and 22.
45G.C. Ware, "Platinum Group Metals," in Minerals Yearbook, 1963, pp. 4—.5.
46 TheU.K. refines ores from South Africa and the U.S.S.R., and Switzerland is
a trading center for metals primarily of U.S.S.R. origin.46 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
as a result, the German and EEC indexes of price competitiveness
for SITC group 681 as a whole moved favorably for the U.S.
The. NBER indexes for this group were based in part on prices
published by trade sources and in part on information from about a
score of other sources.
ZINC
Lead and zinc are linked together because they are frequently
found in the same ores. Since zinc is more important in trade, it
will be discussed first,
About 40 per cent of the mine production o.f zinc is accounted for
by the New World and about one-third by Europe; the United States
is responsible for about one-third of the Output of the Americas, and
the U.S.S.R. for a similar share of European output. Australia is the
third most important producer, providing about 10 per cent of the
world supply. U.S. production plummeted from high Korean War
levels and the gradual comeback since the 1958 low had not, by .1964,
restored output to its former level. World production, on the other
hand, showed a more persistent expansion; 1963 output was 30 per cent
above
Most of the ore-producing countries also export unwrought zinc,
particularly Canada, the U.S.S.R., and Australia. However, as with
lead, smelter production tends to be located in industrialized areas.
The United States and Europe account for over two-thirds of world
smelter output, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. alone accounting for
23 and 13 per cent, respectively. The shares of Japan, Canada, Belgium,
France, Poland, and Australia fall in the 5 to 8 per cent range.48
Belgium, without ore supplies of its own, is a major factor in the world
zinc trade. The leading importers are the U.K., the U.S., and Germany.
U.S. government intervention has been a more important factor in
the lead and zinc markets than in other metals. Although at times,
especially in wartime, the United States has adopted measures to
stimulate exploration and production, during most of the past decade
47 Metal Statistics, p. 21. Belgium, the U.S., France, the U.K., and Germany were
the big importers of zinc ores and concentrates. In general, the U.S. relied heavily
on Canada and Latin America for supplies while the European importers drew
upon European as well as Latin American and Canadian supplies. The U.K.
obtained over three-quarters of its raw material from Australia.
48 H. J. Schroeder,. "Zinc," in Minerals Yearbook, 1963, p. 29.Competitiveness in Individual Groups. 47
U.S. policy has been faced with a high-cost domestic industry in a
world in which other sources of supply were capable of substantial
expansion in output. The basic fact is that U.S. deposits of high-grade
ores have been so depleted that in recent years the domestic mining
industry has been working ores that are only half as rich in metal
content as ores mined in foreign countries.49 The U.S. industry thus
has required higher prices than foreign producers. In the slump after
the Korean War boom, the U.S. government rejected the domestic
producers' application for additional protection against imports and
embarked upon a stockpiling program that absorbed the equivalent
of one-fifth to one-fourth of the domestic mine production of lead
and zinc in the four years beginning in mid-1954.5° A still larger
quantity of lead was acquired from foreign producers in l956—.6l by
bartering surplus agricultural commodities. Zinc was also acquired from
foreign sources through barter in 1956—57 in an amount equal to a
little more than 70 per cent of the quantity acquired from domestic
producers in This program was accompanied by efforts to
induce foreign producers to restrict this production.
It seems likely, however, that the net effect of government stock-
piling was not only to push up prices but also to stimulate lead and
zinc production, especially in the U.S. where acquisitions from domestic
sources were confined almost entirely to metal from newly mined
ore.52 As long as the government was absorbing substantial quantities-
of lead and zinc, the excess of production over consumption did not
depress prices. When the governmen.t announced the curtailment of
its procurement programs in 1957, there was a worldwide decline in
lead and zinc prices. Indeed, world prices fell below those in the
U.S. by more than freight and insurance, with the result that foreign
refined pig lead and slab zinc were sold in the U.S. at substantial
discounts below the U.S. producers' prices.58
these circumstances, the U.S. abandoned its effort to avoid pro.
49 U.s. Tariff Commission, Lead and Zinc: Report to the President on Escape-
Clause Investigation No. 65, Washington, 1958, p. 18.
5° Based on data in Inquiry into the Strategic and Critical Material Stockpiles
of the U.S., Part 4, p. 1240.
51 Ibid., pp. 1264—1265.
52 Lead and Zinc: Report to the President, 1958, p. 29.
ss ibid., pp. The duty on lead has been 1.0625 cents per pound and on
zinc .7 cents per pound since 1951. Freight and insurance costs have of course varied
but they have generally been less than 1 cent per pound.48 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
tective measures in the course of aiding its domestic producers. Effective
in October 1958, the U.S. limited imports of unmanufactured lead
and zinc to 80 per cent of the average annual commercial imports
in 1953—57. The effect was to raise U.S. prices and to increase the
difference between the U.S. and foreign prices.54
The demand for zinc was stronger than that for lead, and the
operation of market forces outside the• U.S. changed the price relation-
ship of the two metals earlier than in the U.S.; the of zinc,
which had been 2 or 3 cents lower per pound than the price of lead
for a number of years, first exceeded the lead price in London at
the end of 1958, whereas the price crossover did not occur in the
U.S. until a year later. The resumption of a notable upward trend
in the free world consumption of lead and zinc began in 1959, but
the expansion in zinc was greater.56
The recovery of metal markets in early 1964 caused first a
ing of the differential between New York and London zinc prices
and then a reversal of the historical pattern, in which the London
price had been lower than the New York price.
In July 1964 zinc producers outside the U.S., fearful of the adverse
effect of rising London Metal Exchange zinc quotations upon the
competitive position of the metal, began an effort to maintain a
producers' price as in copper. The U.S. released 75,000 tons—equivalent
to about 7 per cent of a year's domestic production—from its stock-
pile to alleviate the shortage.56
As a result of these developments the U.K.-to-U.S. index of com-
petitiveness fluctuated more than the indexes for other nonferrous
metals; it wound up in 1964 in a position reflecting much higher
relative U.K. prices than in any former year. Zinc export prices from
the Continent tended to conform to the U.K. pattern of changes
over time.
LEAD
The Americas account for about one-fourth of the world's mine
production of lead, the centrally planned economies for one-fourth,
54 See Lead and Zinc: Report to the President, Washington, 1960, Tables 10
and 11; and 1965, p. 26 and Tables 11 and 12.
55 Metal Statistics, 1954—63, pp. 11 and 23.
56 F. R. Jeffrey, "Zinc," in Engineering and Mining Journal, February 1965, p. 108.Competitiveness in Individual Groups 49.
Australia for one-sixth, and non-Soviet Europe for one-seventh. U.S.
mine output, which still makes up over one-third of the New World
production, declined by nearly 25 per cent from 1953—54 to 1962—63.
World output increased by about the same percentage, expansion being
most rapid in the Soviet Bloc.
Belgium, Germany, the U.S., and France import large quantities
of ore from Canada, Latin America (especially Peru and Bolivia),
and Australia. The European countries also rely upon closer sources
such as Sweden, Bulgaria, and Morocco. Belgium and the U.S. obtain
substantial supplies from southern Africa. There has been a growing
tendency to process ores in the countries in which the mines are
located.
The geographical distribution of smelter lead production never-
theless isstill dominated by the pattern of industrialization. The
Americas and non-Soviet Europe each produce one-third of the world
total, and the Soviet Bloc one-fourth. The U.S. accounts for half of
the New World output, its production having declined in absolute
as well as relative terms during the past decade.
The most marked increases in the consumption of lead have been
in the Soviet Bloc and non-Soviet Europe; U.S. consumption has
hardly increased over the past decade. In the U.S. over half of current
consumption is supplied by recovered scrap.
Manufactured lead is traded predominantly in unwrought lorm.
The chief exporters are Australia, Mexico, the U.S.S.R., and Canada.
Belgium, without ores of its own, is a significant net exporter of
lead. Germany and the U.K. also export small quantities, but they
are net importers by a substantial margin. The U.S., an important
net exporter of lead before World War II, is the largest importer,
followed at some distance by the U.K. and Germany.
With only brief exceptions at the very end of the period, the New
York price of lead exceeded the London price during the period covered
by this study. In the early years the difference between lead prices
in New York and London fluctuated around the transfer costs of
approximately 2 cents a pound (1.0625 cents duty plus freight and
insurance). With the announcement of the end of stockpile purchases
in 1957 and the subsequent imposition of quotas by the U.S. govern-
ment, the differential tended to be larger—around 3 or even 4 cents
a pound—and more variable. It shrank again with the recovery of metal50 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
markets in 1964 as U.S. producers restrained the extent of price in-
creases in the face of tightening supplies; in the latter part of the
'year it actually reversed direction for a time. The U.S. released
50,000 tons of lead from its stockpile in 1964.
As in the case of zinc, official prices tend to reflect actual trans-
actions prices more fully when supply and demand are in balance
and prices are stable. In periods of excess supply, a number of export
transactions take place at lower prices, and in periods of shortage,
some exports are sold at premium prices. Even where producers
attempt to. maintain the published quotations, secondary metal is
readily sold at a discount or premium. Thus, in the case of the U.S.
price movement for lead exports between mid-1963 and mid-1964,
for example, we have estimated the export price increase at 26 per
cent, although the several publicly available wholesale and producers'
price series show increases ranging from 18 per cent.
Our indexes show that European prices were lowest relative to the
U.S. in 1961 1962 when there was a differential of about 20 per
cent, 'with U.K. prices slightly lower than those of Germany and the
EEC. Differences were much smaller in 1964 and, in the case of the
EEC, prices were almost up to the level.
TIN
Tin is one of the few important metals whièh were not marked
by rising world production during the period, under Mine
production of tin in 1962—63 was within 1 per cent of the 1953—54
level. The major sources of supply in the terminal years were Malaya
(32 per cent), China (15 per cent), Bdlivia per cent), the U.S.S.R.
(10 per cent), and Indonesia and Thailand (8 per cent each). Increases
in output in China, the U.S.S.R., and Thailand were offset by declines
in Indonesia, Bolivia, and the Republic of the Congo. Only as the
period drew to an end did it appear that serious supply shortages
and premium prices, might begin to stimulate a new surge in
In some cases, such as Malaya and the U.S.S.R., tin
are smelted and only tin metal is exported. In others, particularly
Bolivia and Indonesia, tin concentrates are exported. Bolivian, con-
centrates have gone mainly to the United Kingdom, while the destina-
tion of Indonesian concentrates. has varied with political circumstances
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others. In recent years some developing countries, notably Nigeria,
which exported concentrates, have begun to establish local smelting
facilities. The result of these changes, already noted, was that the
share of the U.S. and Western Europe in world tin smelting declined
from more than 50 per cent in 1953—54 to around 20 per cent in
1962—63.
Malaya has been the world's major exporter of unwrought tin,
probably accounting for more than 75 per cent of world trade.
U.K., the Netherlands, Belgium, the U.S.S.R., China, and Germany
have accounted for most of the balance. A large part of the tin
consumed in the United States and Western Europe is used to make
tinpiate (SITC subgroup 674.7), which is five times more important
in international trade than tin itself.
The price of tin has been influenced by the International Tin
Agreement, which came into effect in 1956. A buffer stock financed
by the producer countries was established and its manager was required
to buy tin when the price was below the floor (successively raised
from £640 per long ton in 1956 to £1,000 near the end of 1964) and
to sell when the price was over the ceiling (E800 in 1956 and £1,200
by the end of 1964). When the price was between the floor and ceiling
but near one or the other, the manager could buy or sell (according
to the case) at his discretion, but when the price was in a middle £50
or £100 range between the floor and ceiling he could not come into
the market. Export quotas were also assigned to the six producing
member countries from December 1957 to October 1960; quotas were
curtailed during 1958 but expanded in 1959—60.
In the fi:rst few years of the period covered in this study, U.S.
stockpile purchases buoyed up the world tin By 1957, these
purchases had been ended and this shift, combined with low tin
demand due to recession conditions and with Russian sales, forced
the buffer stock manager to buy tin to keep the price from failing
below the floor. Nevertheless, the producer members insisted upon
raising the floor price in 1958 and the buffer stock manager ran 'out
of money. In the final years of the period, the opposite difficulty
appeared; the buffer stock manager had no tin to sell. This situation
57'Deliveriesto the U.S. under stockpile contracts in 1953—56 were equivalent to
more than one year's world production (Inquiry into 'the Strategic and Critical
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first appeared in mid-1961, when it was attributed to
Prices subsequently declined partly because of a U.S. decision to release
50,000 long tons (nearly a third of a year's world production) from
its stockpile, and the buffer stock manager was led to buy tin again
in the latter part of 1962. However, the basic situation was one of
shortage since consumption had exceeded production for several years,
and prices began to climb again. In October 1963 the buffer stock
ran out of tin once more and prices rose, first moderately and then
at an accelerating rate, reaching a peak in October 1964 that was about
twice the October .1963 level. The price increases came despite U.S.
stockpile releases of 6,000 tons in 1963 and 22,000 tons in
There are three major tin markets: the London Metal Exchange,
which includes both spot and future transactions and which is the
focus of consumers, traders, and speculators from all over the world;
the Penang market (Singapore before May 1964), which deals in tin
for physical delivery; and the New York market, which caters chiefly
to U.S. consumers. All three markets are closely related, but short-run
divergent price movements are possible in narrow limits since it takes
four to six weeks to move tin from Malaya to London or New York
and one or two weeks between London and New York. Transfer costs
usually ensure that the London and New York prices will be higher
than the Malayan price; the New York price, in turn, has tended to
run slightly higher than the London price. The index of price cOm-
petitiveness has thus not varied very much from year to year.
We had to rely on published prices to. a considerable extent in
making up our indexes for this group, as we had independent data
only from a few U.S. and a few German sources, all buyers. However,
our U.S. sources rather consistently showed smaller fluctuations than
the published prices and we based our indexes for the U.S. mainly
on these private data.
MISCELLANEOUS NONFERROUS METALS
This category covers about a score of nonferrous metals. Belgium
is the largest exporter, followed by the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and
Germany. Our time-to-time indexes are based on the more important
metals in the group such as magnesium, tungsten, molybdenum,
58Engineeringand Mining Journal, February 1963, p. 111.
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antimony, cobalt, chromium, cadmium, titanium, and manganese.
More extensive use was made of wholesale price data in this category
than in any other nonferrous group. For example, five of the seventeen
series used in preparing the U.S. index represented published whole-
sale price series. The German indexes are based on the smallest
number of series, six, although in this case none of them represents
a published series. The indexes for all of the areas (the U.S., the
U.K., Germany, and the EEC) reveal a sharp drop in prices between
1953 and 1957. Aside from a further decline in the U.S. between 1957
and 1961, prices tended to remain stable through 1961 and 1962, only to
rise again in 1963 and more sharply in 1964. The rise in these recent
years carried European prices beyond the levels that had prevailed in
1953, whereas the same was not true of the U.S. prices. Thus by 1964
European miscellaneous nonferrous metal prices which had often been
15 to 20 per cent below U.S. prices were about the same as U.S.
prices (U.K. prices were actually still a little lower while German
prices were a little higher than U.S. prices).
Conclusion
During most of the years covered by this study, European international
prices of nonferrous metals were 5 to 10 per cent below U.S. prices,
taking the bundle of nonferrous metals exported by the advanced
countries as a whole. The gap between American and European prices
was widest in 1961 and 1962, but had diminished substantially, to
only a couple of percentage points, by 1964. Among the European
countries, Germany appeared to have less of a price advantage over
the U.S. than either the U.K. or the EEC countries as a group. In
both copper and aluminum, the two most important nonferrous metals
in the exports of developed countries, the difference between U.S.
and foreign price levels was larger for worked metals than for un-
wrought metals.
There is considerable variability among the individual metals. In
some instances, such .as lead in 1962, European international prices
were as much as 20 per cent below those of the U.S., and in other, less
frequent cases European prices were higher. The latter was true, for
example, of EEC copper prices in 1964, German prices of primary
•aluminum in 1962, European silver prices more often than not, and
U.K. zinc prices in 1964. It was quite generally the case among the54 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
metals that the U.S. was least competitive with respect to price in
1961—62 and that the U.S. position in 1964 was more favorable than
at any other time except, possibly, the very beginning of our period.
For primary metal products, direct price competition in the sense
of cutting prices in order to enter new markets, including the home
markets of rival producers, appears to have been confined to the
aluminum industry. For worked metals, price competition has been
somewhat more common.
In a number of the other major nonferrous metals, U.S. prices
have often been maintained at comparatively stable levels, usually
higher than those abroad. In slack markets the U.S. producers have
not been completely immune to pressures from lower foreign prices
because, when the price difference becomes large enough, foreign
primary metal is brought into markets ordinarily served by U.S.
producers, and, more frequently, •because products fabricated out of
foreign metals begin to displace those produced from U.S. metals.
Pricing policies, particularly in copper, have been influenced by the
threat of price competition from rival metals and other substitute
products.
The pricing policies followed in Europe tend to differ from those
of the U.S. There is a greater tendency in Europe to differentiate
between home and foreign markets and to export metals at prices
reflecting current world supply and demand conditions, although by
the end of the period under study both primary copper and primary
zinc were being sold in Europe at prices established by; producers
rather than at prices set on the free market.
These differences in pricing policy between the United States and
Europe do not seem to be attributable to different degrees of con-
centration, because the degree of concentration in the nonferrous
metal industries tends to be high in both the U.S. and Europe, par-
ticularly at the primary stage. It is more likely the natural outcome
of the, difference in the capacity of the nonferrous metal industries
relative to home demand in the two areas. For the U.S. producers, the
home market is of overwhelming importance and since it is protected
—always by transport cost and time, and frequently by trade restrictions
as well—it is only sensible to gear price policies to it. Of course, separate
pricing policies can be applied to exports, and sometimes they have
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The nonferrous industries of the European countries, on the other
hand, are built to serve external markets; in some extreme cases such
as Belgian copper and Norwegian aluminum, for example, the domestic
market absorbs only a small part of output. The pressure on firms in
this position to meet world supply and demand condition is,of
course, much greater. This situation also leads to differential pricing
for various markets.
Thus, the imperfections and fragmentation of world nonferrous
metal markets are greater than might have been expected for goods
which, in their homogeneity and ubiquity of use, conform so well to'
the stereotype of standardized internationally traded goods. Tariffs
and quotas,the division of markets,the tendencyto maintain
customary trade channels, technical know-how, and other factors
operate to varying degrees—not so much in the dynamic aluminum
industry as in the slower-growing copper industry—to, reduce the
impact of price differences on trade flows.
Although, as noted, the direction of trade in nonferrous metals
is influenced by a great variety of factors other than price, to an
extent probably greater than for other products included in this study,
much of the trade pattern is consistent with price relationships. For
example, if we rank the 1963 ratios of U.K. and EEC exports to
U.S. exports for the five categories of metals for which price ratios
were considered at kast partially publishable, we find them, as ex-
pected, inversely related to the price ratios (Table 11).
There may be an 'element of chance involved, in view of the rough-
ness of the data and the fact that the differences between some of
the price ratios are quite small, but there is, in any case, considerable
consistency between the prices and the export movements for these
metals.
One result of the computation of these indexes of international
prices is to show that for nonferrous metals, as for iron and steel,
the existing wholesale price and export unit value indexes are at times
seriously misleading as measures of international price movements and
of international price competitiveness.
Some of the deficiencies of the official data are due to the inadequacy
of commodity coverage. The improvement of coverage through the
addition of trade journal prices for commodities not in the official
series moves the index for U.S. wholesale prices closer to the NBER56 Comparative Prices of Nonferrous Metals
TABLE 11
Comparison of Export Value and Price Ratios for Five Categories of
Metals: to U.S., EEC to U.S.,. and U.K. to EEC













Copper, unwrought 4 4 4 4 .4 4
Copper, worked 2 3 2 3 2 1
684. 1Aluminum, unwrought 5 5 5 5 5 3
68.4.2Aluminum, worked 3 2 3 1 3 5
Lead 1 1 1 2 1 2
Note: Price ratios are from Tables 8 and 10 and text discussion.
Values are from same sources as Table 1.
index in every period, and the effect is usually, although not always,
the samefor foreign country indexes.
The unit value index differs more from the NBER index than the
wholesale price indexes in most years. Part of this discrepancy may
again be coverage, since the unit value data used for the index cover
only copper and aluminum. However, even if we examine the relation-
ship of NBER indexes to unit values within copper and aluminum
we find large differences, and these do not seem to be explainable in
terms of differences in coverage within the group. They are apparently
the result of defects in the basic unit value data for individual
commodities.
We conclude, therefore, that even in a relatively uncomplicated
group such as nonferrous metals, the existing price measures give
inadequate or misleading impressions of international price corn-
petitivefless.